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PREVIEW; BNSF Railway Company v. The Asbestos Claims 
Court of the State of Montana, Honorable Amy Eddy, 
Presiding Judge: Does Allowing Defendants to Assign Liability 
to Non-Parties Violate Due Process? 
Mariah Johnson* 
 The Montana Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in this 
matter Wednesday, October 30, 2019 at 9:30 AM, in the Courtroom 
of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building, 
Helena, MT. Anthony M. Nicastro will likely appear for Petitioner. 
Alan M. McGarvey will likely appear for Respondent. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case presents the issue of a Montana statutory defense’s 
constitutionality. It concerns whether BNSF can allege a non-party, 
W.R. Grace & Company’s (“Grace”), conduct absolves it of liability 
for the Plaintiffs’ injuries. Known previously as the “empty chair 
defense,” it is referred to here as a non-party defense, or the “settled 
party defense” based on the language added to the 2017 version of 
the statute. The Montana Supreme Court’s decision on BNSF’s 
ability to assert Grace’s conduct absolves it of liability will have 
important implications for the ability of injured plaintiffs to recover 
damages against named defendants. BNSF maintains the Asbestos 
Claims Court employed a flawed strict liability analysis in 
determining that the defense under MCA § 27–1–703(6) did not 
apply. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Grace mined vermiculite near Libby, Montana from 1922–
1990.1 BNSF transported the vermiculite concentrate, which was 
contaminated with amphibole asbestos, from the mine into 
downtown Libby.2 Plaintiffs allege their diseases result from 
exposure to the asbestos BNSF transported into Libby.3 Grace later 
filed for bankruptcy, resulting in the creation of a trust to assume 
 
* Mariah Johnson, J.D. Candidate 2021, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at 
the University of Montana. 
1 Pl.’s Answer Br. at 2, June 14, 2019, No. OP 19-0085. 
2 Pl.’s Answer Br. at 2–3. 
3 Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 2, May 16, 2019, No. DA 19-0085. 
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Grace’s liability for asbestos claims.4 This trust led to a dispute over 
whether Grace was a “settled party,” allowing BNSF to assert a non-
party defense to liability under Montana statute.5 The Asbestos 
Claims Court (“ACC”), after consideration of the case, granted 
summary judgment to the Plaintiffs. Of particular note, it held that 
BNSF was precluded from raising non-party defenses.6 BNSF 
asserts the ACC’s holding erroneously prohibited it from negating 
liability with the conduct of a non-party it contends settled with the 
Plaintiffs.7 BNSF applied for a writ of supervisory control to allow 
further consideration of the ACC’s rulings, which the Court 
granted.8 The Court then ordered briefing to consider whether 
summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff on BNSF’s defenses was 
appropriate in preparation for oral argument.9 
 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
BNSF contends that the fund formed by Grace’s bankruptcy 
constitutes a settlement with the Plaintiffs, making Grace a “settled 
party” under § 27–1–703.10 Section 27–1–703(6)(a) states that, in a 
negligence action, a defendant may assert that the claimant’s 
damages were caused in full or in part by a person with whom the 
claimant has settled or released from liability.11 BNSF supports its 
claim that the fund is a settlement by pointing to the Trust 
Agreement stating the fund is a “qualified settlement fund;” the 
Trust Distribution Plan stating the fund is to “provide for resolving 
 
4 Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 18. 
5 Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 17-18; Pl.’s Answer Br. at 37. 
6 Pl.’s Answer Br. at 1–2, 11–12. 
7 Pet. for Writ of Supervisory Control at 2, Feb. 04, 2019, On review from No. 
AC-17-0694. 
8 Order-the Court will take supervisory control of the January 15 and 18, 2019 
rulings, Order for No. OP 19-0085 and OP 19-0088 (Mont. Apr. 16, 2019); See 
also Hannah Higgins, Oral Argument Preview, Maryland Casualty Company v. 
The Asbestos Claims Court, and the Honorable Amy Eddy, Asbestos Claims 
Court Judge: What Duty does a Workers’ Compensation Insurer Owe the 
Employees of its Insured?, 80 MONT. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2019), 
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr_online/vol80/iss1/1.  
9 Order-the Court will take supervisory control.; Pet. for Writ of Supervisory 
Control at 5–6. 
10 Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 20. 
11 MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–703(6)(a) (2017) (As of the time of this preview, 
the 2019 version of the Montana Code Annotated has been released. No changes 
were made to this particular statute). 
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all Asbestos PI Claims;” and the Reorganization Plan stating the 
fund “constitutes a settlement.”12 BNSF relies on these documents 
and MCI Sales and Serv. v. Hinton,13 wherein Texas applied a 
similar statute and found a similar fund to constitute a settlement, to 
argue Grace is a settled party under the statute and it may therefore 
bring in Grace’s conduct as the cause of the Plaintiffs’ injuries to 
absolve its liability.14 
 
Respondents argue § 27–1–703 does not apply because this 
is a strict liability case; and further, Plaintiffs have not settled with 
Grace, so even if the statute did apply, Grace would not qualify as a 
settled party.15 According to Respondents, while Plaintiffs filed 
claims with Grace’s fund, they have not received money or 
otherwise settled any claims. They point out that the existence of an 
unsettled claim is necessary to recover from Grace’s fund.16 They 
further contend that the mere existence of the fund does not render 
Grace a settled party and that the bankruptcy terms make clear that 
claims to the fund could become personal injury lawsuits.17 
Respondents also assert that the language of § 27–1–703(6) itself 
precludes its use in this case because it uses the past tense; as the 
trust claims are still pending, Grace cannot be a “settled party.”18 In 
response to BNSF’s use of Hinton, Respondents note that the Texas 
Court relied heavily on portions of its law that are missing from 
Montana’s; therefore, they argue, the Texas law cannot be used to 




The primary issue before the Court is whether a party can 
absolve its liability by presenting evidence of a non-party’s conduct 
under § 27–1–703. Previous legislative attempts to allow this 
defense in Montana have been held unconstitutional.20 Two primary 
 
12 Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 18–19. 
13 329 S.W.3d 475 (Tex. 2010); Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 19. 
14 Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 19–20. 
15 Pl.’s Answer Br. at 36–38. 
16 Pl.’s Answer Br. at 36–37. 
17 Pl.’s Answer Br. at 37. 
18 Pl.’s Answer Br. at 38. 
19 Pl.’s Answer Br. at 38–39. 
20 Brief of Amicus Curiae Montana Trial Lawyers Association at 4–6, June 13, 
2019, No. OP 19-0085. 
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challenges to the defense exist: Newville v. State, Dept. of Family 
Services21 and Plumb v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, Missoula 
County.22 In Newville, the Court ruled that apportioning liability to 
non-parties violated plaintiffs’ substantive due process.23 The Court 
reasoned that plaintiffs would not receive fair adjudication of their 
claims because allowing the defense meant plaintiffs had to 
anticipate defendants implicating non-parties to effectively make 
their case.24 In Plumb, an amended version of the statute was 
similarly held unconstitutional because it did not allow the unnamed 
third party to defend itself against defendants’ apportionment of 
liability.25 The Court contended the amendment ignored the central 
point of Newville; any apportionment of liability to a party that did 
not appear would be an inaccurate reflection of the true degree of 
that party’s fault and thus violate substantive due process.26 
 
Precedent, then, indicates that the Court is hesitant to allow 
a non-party defense for fear it would affect plaintiffs’ and non-
parties’ due process rights. This worry is substantially backed by 
reason. Allowing the implication of any non-party precludes injured 
plaintiffs from collecting the full damages they may be due by law 
simply because a defendant can point to another party. Such a 
situation, where a party responsible for the plaintiff’s injury may not 
have to pay full damages, seems diminish the point of bringing a 
lawsuit for the plaintiff; it makes no sense for the plaintiff to expend 
resources if their claim can be pushed onto a non-party. Further, if a 
non-party cannot defend itself, it may be held unfairly liable for 
something it may not have had a hand in or was involved in to a 
lesser degree than the defendant asserted. Having to pay damages 
that may not accurately represent the non-party’s responsibility can 
be financially damaging to the non-party. The Court must decide, 
considering the interests of plaintiffs and non-parties, whether the 
2017 version of the statute addresses these due process concerns. 
 
The 2017 version of the statute still authorizes defendants to 
assert non-parties are liable by allowing implication of parties with 
 
21 882 P.2d 793, 799 (Mont. 1994). 
22 927 P.2d 1011, 1016 (Mont. 1996). 
23 Newville, 882 P.2d. at 803. 
24 Id. at 802. 
25 Plumb, 927 P.2d at 1018–19. 
26 Id. at 1020–21. 
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whom the claimant has settled or released from liability.27 The 
language is like that which was found unconstitutional in Newville 
and Plumb; the primary difference is the addition of the settled party 
language.28 Merely adding the settled party language does not seem 
to solve the issue of ensuring injured plaintiffs can fairly collect 
damages. A party settling with a plaintiff does not necessarily mean 
that the plaintiff was able to collect damages from that party. 
Further, just because a party settled does not mean that it admitted 
liability. The “settled party defense” thus seems to duplicate exactly 
what the Court was worried about in Newville and Plumb: plaintiffs 
may not be able to fully litigate their claims for damages, and 
defendants may be unfairly apportioned liability.29 The 2017 version 
of the statute, however, seems to address the Court’s primary due 
process concerns in another part.  
 
The 2017 version of the statute allows the non-party to 
defend itself and, further, allows the plaintiff to answer to the 
defense.30 The Court noted in Horn v. Bull River Country Store 
Properties, LLC, 31 that the defect it found in previous versions was 
the lack of such provisions, which lead juries to apportion 
inappropriate liability to unrepresented parties. While the Court did 
not directly address whether these provisions remedied the due 
process issues, it did seem to imply that their presence would 
prevent the due process issues of previous versions of the statute.32 
Allowing a non-party to defend itself of course eliminates the 
concern that it previously could not do so. Perhaps more 
importantly, allowing plaintiffs to answer to the non-party’s defense 
supports fair adjudication of their claims. When a non-party can 
present a defense as to why it is not liable, a plaintiff can prepare a 
case which either rebuts or supports the apportion of liability while 
having access to the non-party’s information via discovery. As such, 
there is a fair chance to make the case for damages against all 
parties. Thus, regardless of whether BNSF properly asserted its 
defense or Grace qualifies as a settled party, it seems likely that, 
under the current version of § 27–1–703(6), the Court will find that 
 
27 MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27–1–703(6)(a) (2017). 
28 Newville, 883 P.2d at 804; Plumb, 927 P.2d at 1018 
29 Newville, 883 P.2d at 802; Plumb, 927 P.2d at 1020. 
30 MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27–1–703(6)(f)(ii)–(iii). 
31 288 P.3d 218, 222 (Mont. 2012). 
32 Id. 
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the “settled party defense” as it now stands does not violate 




Previous iterations of § 27–1–703 have been held 
unconstitutional for violating the due process rights of plaintiffs and 
non-parties. The Court was concerned that the statute afforded no 
opportunity for non-parties to defend themselves in court, requiring 
that plaintiffs must prove a absent party was not responsible for their 
injuries in order to collect damages from named parties. However, 
the 2017 version of the statute addresses the Court’s concerns by 
allowing non-parties to defend themselves against defendants’ 
claims and plaintiffs to answer to that defense. This removes the 
biggest due process concerns by ensuring everyone has a say in 
court, which makes it likely the Court will allow the “settled party 
defense.” The Court will thus likely rule this version of § 27–1–703 
constitutional, doing so because the legislature has addressed the 
concerns brought up in Newville and Plumb. 
 
